Introduction
Within its own borders, the European Union (EU) is certainly a peace project. Its internal security agenda requires stability in the neighbourhood immediately abutting it to the south and to the east. These areas have a substantial number of acute protracted conflicts and the risk of the ignition of latent conflicts cannot be neglected there. The EU's external security and stability imperative, however, does not make it a peacebuilding project in the neighbourhood and beyond by default.
The official EU institutions have political and conceptual limitations that prevent them from meaningfully engaging with and addressing state formation conflicts. These include an inability to engage with the unrecognized entities. There are also fundamental tensions between the desire to put pressure on the states that systematically violate individual and collective rights and the need to ally with the same governments to cope with the security threats. A tricky interplay between the Idealpolitik in the declarations of intent and the Realpolitik in the implementation of foreign and security policy leaves the essential aspects of the conflicts in question largely unaddressed. The lack of in-house expertise on the state of the art in the field of conflict transformation and peacebuilding negatively affects the operation and the image of the EU in the conflict areas. Nevertheless the respective European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plans promise support for conflict resolution, which raises certain expectations.
There is a need for the EU to shift from the generic schemes of the Europeanization of the polities and economies in the Neighbourhood as an implicit road map to peaceful conflict resolution towards fine tuned and explicit peacebuilding strategies. Partnership with civil society organizations (CSOs) that professionalize in the field at all stages and levels of conflict interventions is crucial to make this shift. In the EU documents and declarations involvement of civil society in peacebuilding is regarded as vital. However there is lack of recognition that conflict transformation and peacebuilding by civil society requires a distinct conceptual basis, a specific support structure and a relevant impact assessment that may not be in line with the conventional project-based or activity-based planning and evaluation of the performance of CSOs, and generic and schematic support for civil society.
The present paper addresses the disconnect between the EU and the civil society operating in the field of peacebuilding at the level of theories of change underlying policies, strategies and activities with the aim of transforming and resolving conflicts.
Theories of change are elicited from the reflections and experiences of CSOs both internal and external that operate in the conflict settings in the European Neighbourhood. Theories of change in use by the EU are reconstructed from the main documents that concern conflicts and peacebuilding in the European Neighbourhood.
The theories of change identified as being in use by CSOs and the EU are juxtaposed and analyzed against the backdrop of the specific class of state formation conflicts, on the one hand, and institutional capacity of the CSOs to be change agents, on the other, by way of laying groundwork for a new specialized framework for the forecast and assessment of the impact of CSOs on peacebuilding. Conceptually, the framework proposed in this paper builds on the peace as change versus peace as stability approach and on the notion of civil society as an institutional basis for peacebuilding. This framework can be considered by the EU institutions for building strategic partnerships with international and local civil society to enhance conflict transformation in the European Neighbourhood.
EU support for civil society and peacebuilding: do these universes cross?
The states and regions east and south of the new European borders are home to state formation conflicts (Wallenstein, 2002) that are characterized by a clash between minorities' aspirations to re-define the international borders and achieve statehood and the existing States' (and majorities') determination to preserve the existing nation-states within their internationally recognized territories. There is no straightforward solution under international law for resolving these conflicts due to the clash between the principles of the inviolability of state borders and of the right for self-determination of people. The conflicts in question have lasted from fifteen to over forty years, are marked by one or several wars and smaller scale violence, isolation of the rival societies from each other, asymmetry in the international recognition of the entities in conflict and degree of the involvement of the external states as primary, secondary or third parties.
Given their duration and defining role in the development of the polities and societies in question, these conflicts can be defined as protracted, deeply-rooted conflicts that require substantial political change within the rival polities along with profound changes in the collective self of the societies in conflict for their transformation. Peace processes at the official level have not borne fruit in any case, although the intensity of negotiations, number of breakthroughs and relapses into war, length of stagnation periods and degree of activity and intrusiveness of the third parties varies across the cases.
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was designed in 2003 as a "soft power" foreign policy approach that in essence means to "get others to want what you want" (Nye 2004: 256) . It is important to emphasize that the ENP Action Plans first and foremost are about the EU security that can be ensured through cooperation between the EU and the selected partners in the Neighbourhood. Since the enlargement of the EU beyond its current eastern and southern borders is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future or ever, its security concerns related to the unresolved conflicts and other threats emanating from the Neighbourhood to the east and to the south needed to be addressed in an effective way, but with no "accession carrot". Commitment to the promotion of I argue that the EU does not have real leverage 2 that hypothetically could have influenced state leaderships' and the societies' motivation to revisit and adjust their own positions in favour of an illusory solution of questionable sustainability prospects in the absence of the membership "carrot". The national (or nationalist) agendas seem to have had stronger appeal for the polities and societies caught in the state formation conflict. 2 Generally the EU strongly encourages the states that wish to join in to settle frontier disputes, conflicts with neighbours and minority issues. This requirement was implicit in the Copenhagen criteria and explicitly stated in the decisions of the Essen council in 1995. However, after the accession of the Republic of Cyprus and the association and eventual membership prospects delineated for Bosnia, Kosovo and Serbia where the conflicts were resolved by the parties (Bosnia) or the solution was imposed (Kosovo-Serbia), but peace is "negative" and fragile, the EU integration "carrot" can be regarded as an incentive for peacebuilding rather than the award for having achieved lasting peace within and between the aspiring countries. The power of conditionality has been questioned when the strategy to stimulate the resolution of the conflict with the help of the actualized membership has failed in Cyprus and The Republic of Cyprus became a member without having resolved the conflict. The factor of the EU having granted Turkey candidate status has certainly eased the Greece-Turkey tension over Cyprus, but had little impact on the intra-Cyprus process. Eventually EU membership of the Republic of Cyprus may indirectly affect the rapprochement of the two parts of the island predominantly because of economic considerations. However the progress in the Cyprus conflict transformation to date can be attributed to other factors, such as the opening of the border, economic incentives for Northern Cyprus to reach out, favourable constellation of the two current leaderships and others, but not the EU membership prospect.
Institutionalized democracy in the realm of elections and political pluralism, for example, is not an antidote for ethnic outbidding in the societies that have been and still are involved a nationalist conflict. Neither is democracy incompatible with militarism: a democratic society can opt for a war as a means to pursue national interests or for selfdefense. The overall optimism of the liberal peace paradigm that the EU bases its external policies on should not obscure the need to make strategic adjustments in the environment of unfinished statebuilding, frustrated national identities and persisting insecurity.
Civil society organizations along with other non-governmental sectors, like the media, academia, business and religious institutions are critical internal agents of the changefrom-within. They are well positioned to creatively blend democratization of the society and polity and peacebuilding to ensure that the two intervention strands do not cancel each other out 3 . Civil society worldwide has accumulated the most innovative and cutting edge approaches to conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation and the know how in the design and implementation of peacebuilding initiatives and processes. New ideas for peacebuilding strategies, solution options and peace process formats emerge and are tested and rectified in the realm of civil society.
Some of these ideas further inform the domestic and international official peacebuilding agenda. Local civil society is best positioned to lead its own society towards the elimination of cultural violence. It is a very much needed partner for the EU and other international interveners in the eradication of structural violence. It deals with the consequences of direct violence by mediating for hostage and prisoners of war release and exchange, anti-war campaigning and non-violent resistance, and by contributing to the prevention and cessation of armed hostilities through creating safe spaces and effective processes for negotiations. CSOs that work on the ground ensure sustainability of conflict transformation that is at the heart of peacebuilding. It is the role of the local civil society to build relationships between conflict parties at all levels, including at the highest political level.
The development of civil society is stated as a distinct goal within the ENP (European Council and European Parliament 2004). In turn, strengthening of the local civil society is presented as crucially important for the success of the conflict resolution agenda of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 4 . However there is no theory in the respective EU documents that links the general strengthening of civil society with the enhancement of its peacebuilding capacity except for vague declarations, such as "by virtue of their support for the development of civil society and democracy, NGOs are key actors in long-term conflict prevention" 5 . The fact that conflict prevention has not been an explicit reference in the EU financing instruments 6 until very recently was creating an obstacle to the design and implementation of the targeted support for peacebuilding by civil society. Since the second issue has already been addressed (see Conclusion) I will dwell on the first issue, namely, the vagueness and groundlessness of the framework that links support for civil society with its peacebuilding effect. I will also put forward a proposition that provides a possible explanation for the EU minimalist engagement with civil society in the area of conflict prevention and peacebuilding that favours projects of "low risk and low opportunities" (Hoffman 2004) and blocks realization of the professional peacebuilding expertise of CSOs.
The ENP framework of conflict transformation that could be reconstructed from the Action Plans and other ENP documents originates from the Idealpolitik paradigm of international relations and international peace. The essence of this paradigm is that a country's internal policy and institutions define its foreign policy and that the closer the two countries are in their values, political regimes and level of economic development, the smaller the probability of a war between them. The liberal peace paradigm that is a derivative of the broader Idealpolitik prescribes that that consolidation of democracy and rule of law in the domestic policy of the country of concern is the best guarantee for this country's peaceful relations with the external world (Kober, 1990 Analysis of the prospects for a political shift from armed conflict to genuine conflict transformation demonstrated that it is not solely the state leadership who can move in either direction at its own will, but a combination of factors, such as preference of the state leadership regarding the conflict, ratio of 'war' and 'peace' constituencies within the society and sensitivity of the state leadership to public opinion (Mor 1997) . A dovish leadership of the state where there are elections and other democratic procedures in place, and where the majority of the population opts for the armed path in the conflict, can do little to bring a negotiated solution closer. A hawkish leadership in this case gets a carte blanche. Civil society's role in peacebuilding is aimed at the expansion of the "peace constituency" both in quantity and in their influence on the society and the leadership and at the greater sensitivity of the leadership to the opinion of society. It is the civil society that struggles to close the gaps between the society and the leadership and influence them both. In other words, the struggle is to make society more democratic, with open communication channels and devolved decision-making ( The democratic change within a conflict party is of critical importance, but not tantamount to peacebuilding. The interactive aspect of peacebuilding that implies the creation, sustenance and expansion of an interface between the societies in conflict is being overlooked in the democratization agenda. In the absence of this interface, when the civil societies do not have ties across the line of division, peacebuilding becomes watered down, both as concept and as praxis. Where there is no context from which new intellectual and emotional impetuses emanate, new experiences of interacting with the "other" occur or new resources emerge, the task of the transformation of the conflict by Internal peacebuild ing CSOs
Top leadership Society means of "embedding it into a more promising place" (Galtung 2000:4) is impossible, because any "more promising place" is quickly shrinking. At the same time, the internal organization and political culture of the society in conflict determines the prospects for an internal social change necessary for the initiation, implementation and sustenance of peace. Hence at least two Lederach pyramids should be the graphic display of peacebuilding in order to reflect both, vertical and horizontal dimensions (see Fig. 2 ). monitoring. This leads to the situation when "programmes are initiated and resources allocated for many specific sectoral reasons, but with little thought as to how such choices might be oriented to preventing violent conflicts or buttressing the peaceful 10 For the purpose of simplicity of presentation the EU institutions are not deconstructed further into the different conflict resolution competencies of the European Commission, European Council and the European Parliament. For the detailed description of the division of roles see (Kamov 2006 The diagnosis of the lack of political impact of the civil society peacebuilding projects may be due to the inadequate impact assessment framework. I argue that if an impact of civil society peacebuilding is being sought at the level of social and political change, if 'positive peace' is to be achieved through structural and cultural transformation, it cannot be assessed at the level of activities alone. Emphasis on activities or roles that are depositories of routine activities 11 diverts attention from the more fundamental and defining aspects of peacebuilding and creates a situation when "the ultimate goal of a just, sustainable peace is more often assumed to be linked to the project activities rather than directly factored into the project choices and strategies" (Anderson 2004).
Peacebuilding is not merely a menu of strategies and activities from which to choose, because it has its ethics and theories. Activities by the peacebuilding cluster of civil society ought to be assessed in light of their theories of change that comprise a set of changes at various levels within and around the societies and polities in conflict that are 11 Functionalist approach that is based on the roles of civil society in conflict transformation is an example (Paffenholz, 2009) believed to be needed to resolve the conflict and strategies to achieve the necessary The present paper lays the groundwork for a custom made framework for the forecast and assessment of the impact of CSOs onto peacebuilding in the case of state formation conflicts. The proposed framework can be employed by the EU institutions for building strategic partnerships with international and local civil society to enhance conflict transformation in the European Neighbourhood.
Conflict resolution aspects of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
Analysis of the Action Plans and other ENP documents is revealing of how the EU strategizes its "soft power" conflict transformation at the level of state elites. Since the Action Plans are negotiated and agreed upon with the respected state leaderships, the extent to which the latter are willing to yield to the EU's appeal to peacefully resolve their conflicts and link progress in the conflict resolution with prospects for a more beneficial status vis-à-vis the EU can be judged on the basis of the respective texts.
Factors such as the limits of the state leaderships' openness to actively search for mutually acceptable solutions, the EU willingness to invest in the search and in the postagreement rebuilding of the relationships and not least the preferred solution for the EU, set the context in which the EU's actual and potential support for the peacebuilding civil society in the Neighbourhood can be assessed,
ENP Action Plans and EU conflict interventions: review

Israeli-Palestinian conflict
The and on the elimination of structural, cultural and direct violence 14 .
Furthermore, the EU has signed Action Plans with all the major protagonists of the Middle East peace process. However even this relatively elaborate framework is being criticized by the Arab states as lacking conflict resolution power because it does not offer an instrument and is lacking authority to resolve the key issues of greatest controversy -end of the occupation of lands conquered in 1967 and the refugee return (Asseburg 2009).
Morocco/Western Sahara
The EU position on the conflict in Western Sahara is somewhat ambiguous. 19 A EU-funded project by the Talk Together, a British CSO that was supposed to bring together youth from Morocco proper, from Western Sahara and from the camps in Algeria for a dialogue and joint educational and recreational activities was put on hold, because all the expected participants were stopped at their airports of departure. Western Sahrawi participants reported they were detained, tortured and intimidated 19 . This is not the first time that Sahrawis and Moroccans are prevented by the Moroccan government from travel to events in Europe 19 . Likewise travel of Moroccans and Sahrawis within Morocco is under surveillance, although no formal restrictions apply in most cases. 20 Human Rights Watch (2008) 21 EU/Azerbaijan Action Plan. Available http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/azerbaijan_enp_ap_final_en.pdf 22 EU /Armenia Action Plan. Available http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/armenia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf reluctance of Azerbaijan to engage with Nagorny Karabakh as an independent conflict party and Armenia's insistence on its involvement in the official peace process as such.
The EU states support of the OSCE Minsk group efforts, but the foundations of this support are described differently in the two Action Plans. The Armenia Action Plan mentions the principle of self-determination of peoples as one of the international norms and principles as the basis for a search for a solution . In the Azerbaijan Action Plan the basis for the resolution is the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and OSCE documents that endorse territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and does not refer to the principle of the right for self-determination. It is important to note that in the Azerbaijan Action Plan peaceful resolution of Nagorny Karabakh conflict is priority number one, while in the Armenia Action Plan it is priority number seven, which reflects a clear asymmetry in the degree of urgency to resolve the conflict as felt by the two parties.
In the Country Strategy Paper for Armenia it is merely mentioned that peaceful resolution of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict is a priority for the Armenian government In the area of civil society involvement in peacebuilding, regional youth peace summer camps were mentioned as the progress made in the direction towards a more secure and peaceful South Caucasus. Helsinki Citizens' Assembly was given credit in the Country Progress Reports for having organized regional youth peace force for both, Armenia and 
Moldova/Transnistria
The EU has turned its attention to the Moldova-Transnistria conflict after the big In the Country Strategy Paper the resolution of the Transnistria conflict is said to be the priority for the Moldovan government. The 'to do' list is elaborate and specific 30 , which 29 The EC is co-funding the Georgian State Ministry of Reintegration. 30 Commission (2009d) is an indication of the serious intentions of the EU with regard to the steady progression Assistance to civil society from the EU so far has not expanded beyond the social services sphere, capacity development for NGOs and creation of resource centers 32 .
Moldovan Think Tanks attempt to inform the negotiations agenda and propose a strategy for the transformation of the conflict, however some of the efforts in this direction hardly serve the purpose of the closure of the gap between the two societies and polities 33 . 31 Global Conflict Prevention Pool (UK) has funded an IMPACT project directed by the PATRIR, which brought together researchers from the two banks of the river to compile a book that embodied joint analysis of the consequences of the stagnant peace process. 32 http://www.delmda.ec.europa.eu/eu_and_moldova/pdf/project_civil_society_en.pdf 33 The 3"D" (Democratization, Demilitarization and Decriminalization of Transnistria) proposal by the Institute for Public Policy made it to the top political agenda, but was rejected by Transnistria and by the moderates within the Moldovan civil society. Their line of argument was that democratization of Moldova itself should be the place to start.
Deficiencies of the ENP Action Plans and EU conflict interventions
The first deficiency of the Action Plans and their implementation is that not all conflict parties are recognized and treated as such 34 and only one is a partner and the target of the EU "soft policy". This situation counters the declarative commitment to peacebuilding in the conflict areas in the Neighbourhood by means of "promoting similar reforms on both sides of the boundary lines" 35 Where the EU or other donors support the development of civil society organizations only on one side of the conflict, CSOs on the other, unattended side, find themselves in a much more difficult situation as change agents vis-à-vis their authorities compared to their recognized colleagues. This leads to the dominance of pro-authority organizations 34 For example, the EU presence in Abkhazia was acceptable for the Georgian government as an assistance to people affected by conflict in the conflict zone that includes Abkhazia, predominantly Gal(-i) district and Western Georgia that are referred to as the "inside" of the conflict area and the adjacent region. Explicitly cross-conflict projects were run by the international peacebuilding NGOs, Conciliation Resources, International Alert and Berghof Center that received funding under the RRM and later IfS (http://www.delgeo.ec.europa.eu/en/programmes/rehabilitation1.html). 35 Commission (2007) that are unlikely to raise alternative opinions or challenge the political authority 36 , which is a necessary condition for the rapprochement between the opposing sides.
Besides, solidarity between civil societies on the opposite sides of the conflict is hampered, which impairs resolution of the second-order cross-cutting issues that enhance overall human security in the conflict context.
The second deficiency is the lack of conceptual clarity and of financial and political commitment on behalf of the EU, which is an obstacle for raising its profile as a peacebuilding agent. This transpires in the generic wording of the conflict resolution immediate concern for the parties. In a complex conflict system that has undergone significant changes throughout the course of the conflict a more promising place to initiate conflict transformation may be emphasising solutions rather than problems and acknowledging multiple peaceful futures (Ropers 2008 ).
Emergence of theories and praxis of participatory peacebuilding and multi-track diplomacy, expansion of the notion of violence (direct, cultural and structural), and introduction of justice and reconciliation variables into the peacebuilding equation shaped the contemporary peacebuilding discourse. These theories provide necessary depth and versatility compared to the liberal peace paradigm for building peace in the conflicts that unfold between the state and a non-state entity and between non-state entities, which constitute the majority of the protracted violent conflicts since the end of the Cold War. A systemic approach to conflicts has introduced another important dimension to peacebuilding, namely the "learning" capacity of a conflict system that means it is constantly changing due to external and internal perturbations and is always susceptible to change (Ropers 2008) . All the progressive conflict resolution rhetoric can be found in the conceptual EU documents (Pérez 2004 ), but at the programmatic level and in the politics vis-à-vis protracted conflicts the classic development and security agendas do not seem to be enriched and amended with approaches and strategies that ensure conflict sensitivity at a minimum and preferably a specialized peacebuilding agenda. 
Theories of change in use by peacebuilding CSOs in the five state formation conflicts in the European Neighbourhood
Educating donors is a strategy that is usually implemented in partnerships between
international and within-the-conflict CSOs. Shifting a balance of power of expertise and decision making towards a more consultative and egalitarian funding strategy is an important direction of the CSOs from within-the-conflict and their outside civil society colleagues.
Creating own funding structures
Inaccessibility of the EU funds for local and grassroots CSOs and community groups whose role in peacebuilding is indispensable is regarded as an injustice. Hence 
Peace as stability versus peace as change
Conflict resolution as it is regarded through the conceptual lens of the EU official institutions, is a finite process, of which a peace agreement is the climax because it marks the beginning of stable times as the ultimate desired state of affairs. A peace process then is a unidirectional movement that eradicates conflict, while conflict is viewed as a series of crises or one on-going crisis. Hence the EU conflict resolution strategy is predominantly a crisis response. With the creation of the IfS that replaced the RRM the situation has begun to change. Crisis preparedness aspect of the IfS received greater funding and timeframe of the project was expanded to 18 months that is still too short if weighted against the famous stance of the "two-hundred-year present" as a metaphor for the timeframe needed to repair damage done by a short war. Clearly the solution lies somewhere in between the two extremes of the parachuting crisis response and the Sisyphus option.
Within the frame of reference where crisis and chaos is the only alternative to stability, the latter is naturally regarded as a precious commodity in the modern world. However stability is not tantamount to peace, because stability may mean the reproduction of the inward oppressive political regimes, persistent poverty and lack of economic and human development or disparities in the development in the interest of the dominant group, all of which are either sources or aggravating factors to protracted social conflicts.
Within the integrated peacebuilding framework (Lederach, 1997 ) and the systemic conflict transformation approach (Ropers, 2008) , on the contrary, peacebuilding is a process-structure with a generational horizon, for which "the goal is not stasis, but rather the generation of continuous, dynamic, self-regenerating processes that maintain form over time and are able to adapt to environmental changes" (Lederach, 1997, p. 84).
Peacebuilding dynamic maps onto the conflict dynamic and the two may be synergistic at times, while antagonistic at other times. Political and economic liberalization interventions interact with the conflict and peacebuilding in a number of constellations.
Furthermore, the societies in conflict transform over time in various aspects and in various directions, which may have repercussions for the conflict: they undergo political regime changes and revolutions, experience demographic tides, are exposed to secluded or global economic shocks and environmental disasters. This is not to mention conscious conflict transformation efforts by domestic and outside agencies towards a peaceful and just resolution of the core and secondary issues and the overall transition from a war-system towards a peace-system.
Civil society has the capacity to develop "peripheral vision", or "the capacity to situate oneself in a changing environment with a sense of direction and purpose and at the same time develop and ability to see and move with the unexpected…. With the peripheral vision change processes have a flexible strength, never find dead ends that stop their movement, and relish complexity precisely because complexity never stops offering up new things that may create ways forward, around, or behind whatever jumps in the way" (Lederach 2005:119) . This capacity is invaluable with regard to the constantly changing conflict context. The EU has serious limitations in its manoeuvring with regard to the redistribution of funds and speedy proposal processing. Incorporation of the "constant feedback loop" (Körppen 2006 ) into the EU policy and financing instruments is highly unlikely. Hence the recipient CSOs ought to be entrusted with greater flexibility in the project and program implementation in order to be able to adjust to the changing context and to exercise "serendipity" to maximize the effect of own efforts when the contexts turns out more favourable.
Civil society as an institutional basis for peacebuilding
Professional peacebuilding by civil society organizations is desirable and not objectionable as some suggest (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2007) if professionalization is regarded as an antithesis to dilettantism. This concerns both international and local CSOs. Professional peacebuilding organizations operate in the mode of 'reflective practitioner' and build their interventions on the basis of theories and apply specific methods, while at the same time reflecting on the experience to amend and enrich the theoretical pool and perfect the methodology.
Professional peacebuilding CSOs reach out to those who are hard to reach -political leaders, fighters, radical political parties, big business, otherwise peace practice turns into "preaching to the choir" activities. At the same time, if civil society does not expand the ranks of 'peace constituency' among the society at large either through involving more people into the orbit of its peacebuilding activities or through a multiplier such as television or the Internet, Lederach's pyramid is inverted hence the peacebuilding is fragile and not sustainable.
Professional peacebuilding CSOs work with all clusters that can be identified as having their own conflict experience, goals, ideology regarding conflict resolution methods, their level of motivation to act to approach a more peaceful and just state of society.
Instead of classifying civil society actors in conflict as 'civil' and 'uncivil' it is more instructive to elicit to which collective needs they cater and which frustrated aspirations they voice. The ability of 'civil' society to constructively engage with 'uncivil' society in the dialogue, cross-conflict initiatives, and conflict sensitive development is an indicator of their maturity as peacebuilding agents 41 . Within the professional peacebuilding the principle that "civil society needs to be civil and thus excludes groups that show uncivil behavior" (Paffenholz and Spurke 2006: 8) can do more harm than good to peace process, because those excluded on the grounds of being 'uncivil' may easily turn into 'spoilers' and undermine the most 'civil' peace efforts. People may fear peace made by the leaders on an unclear hence suspicious pretext. People may feel abandoned, betrayed and revengeful if violence and injustice that had been done to them was not addressed and justice was not compromised. People may simply not know any other way to live and make ends meet rather than warfare. Yet these people may be identifying themselves as civil society that advances a social cause and has a constituency.
Finally, professional peacebuilding CSOs are capable of the promotion of social change.
Their civil society capacity and power is fully mobilized for the promotion of unpopular ideas and approaches in a hostile or indifferent environment. The strategies involve modelling co-existence, public awareness raising, demonstration of their adherence to universal human rights principles, generating process and solution alternatives to the zero-sum game approach to the conflict and other advocacy avenues.
Components of the new framework
The new framework for the forecast and assessment of the impact of peacebuilding 
